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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
solely on stare decisis, did not address themselves to the question at all.
Wisconsin adopted the approach of the Michigan Court without ex-
tended discussion, when it considered charitable immunity in the Kojis20
case. However, it has not directed itself, when applying the new rule
to a case at bar, to the question of what weight, if any, should be given
to the reasonable expectations of municipal corporations. Such corpora-
tions may have not insured themselves, relying on the heretofore settled
doctrine of immunity. This is an additional reason for the wholly pros-
pective application of the abrogation urged by Justice Black. The ques-
tion of whether the municipal corporation had legislative authorization
to acquire liability insurance might also be raised,2 1 as, on the other
hand, might the question of the court finding an implied authorization
to purchase such insurance once the court were to remove the immunity.
The Villiams decision in Michigan may be the forerunner of the
abolition of the doctrine of municipal immunity in Wisconsin, parallel-
ing the course of charitable immunity through these same courts.
PATRICIA GODFREY
Condemnation-Public Access to Waterways: With the increas-
ing interest in the various forms of water recreation these days, the
decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Branch v. Oconto County,
13 Wis. 2d 595, 109 N.W. 2d 105 (1961), is important in the area of con-
flict which finds interests of riparian landowners and those of the
general public adverse to each other when seeking access to waters.
In this case1 the court affirmed the validity of Section 23.09(14)2 which
grants to county boards the power to condemn a right of way for a
public highway to any navigable water.
Plaintiff, landowner, had acquired a strip of land surrounding a
lake. This lake because of its shallowness and mucky bottom, offered
no opportunities for fishing or swimming, but proved to be an excel-
lent site for duck hunting. The public was restricted from use of the
lake, except upon payment of a fee to the plaintiff. The county, there-
fore, petitioned for condemnation pursuant to Section 23.09(14).
The landowner did not contest the issues of necessity or naviga-
bility, but claimed that Section 23.09(14) was unconstitutional where
duck hunting is the sole purpose to be served by the taking. He claimed
20 Kojis v. Doctor's Hospital, supra note 18.
21 See 68 A.L.R. 2d 1437 (1959).
1 Branch v. Oconto County, 13 Wis. 2d 595, 109 N.W. 2d 105 (1961).
2 WIS. STAT. §23.09(14) (1959) :
WAYS TO WATERS. The county Board of any county may condemn a right of
way for any public highway to any navigable stream, lake, or other navigable
waters. Such right of way shall not be less than sixty feet in width, and may
be condemned in the manner provided by chapter 32; but the legality or con-
stitutionality of this provision shall in nowise affect the legality or constitution-
ality of the rest of this section.
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that the condemned strip of land was important, because it kept his
rights in the lake intact, and without control of the lake a prospective
business (a private hunting club) would now be impossible. In answer
to these contentions the court stated that Section 23.09(14), author-
izing the condemnation, was not unconstitutional in its application
under these circumstances. It refused to upset a finding that there was a
sufficient necessity for the taking, in the absence of proof showing the
trial court's determination to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not made
in good faith.3
The laws pertaining to waters vary from state to state; thus a basic
understanding of the Wisconsin legal doctrine on this matter is re-
quired to appreciate the basis of the court's decision. Water in a natural
stream or lake is not of itself subject to ownership, 4 but as to the use
of navigable waters, Wisconsin has long recognized this right as being
held by the state in trust for the public.5 Furthermore, beds of navigable
lakes are also subject to this trust, with title to them being held by the
state.6
Navigable waters being held in trust, the test to determine navi-
gability becomes increasingly important, in order to decide who is
the owner of the lake or stream and its respective bed and thus entitled
to its beneficial use. The tests involved vary from state to state and in
different areas of the country,7 most of them requiring commerce as
an essential element. However, in Wisconsin the modern test of navi-
gability states that a stream or lake is navigable "if it is capable of
floating any boat, skiff, or canoe of the shallowest draft used for recre-
ational purposes." 8 This stressing of recreation as an incident of navi-
gation makes more lakes and streams subject to the trust and places
on the riparian landowner an almost impossible task of proving non-
navigability even though the lake or stream would be declared so under
the tests of many other jurisdictions.
Once the water has been declared navigable, the uses the public
as citizens of the state retain in the lake or stream are numerous. Besides
the recognition of hunting,9 fishing,10 boating,"
s Branch v. Oconto County, supra note 1, at 598-601, 109 N.W. 2d 107-109.
4 Lawson v. Mowry, 52 Wis. 219, 234, 9 N.W. 280, 281 (1881).
5 Illinois Steel Co. v. Bilot, 109 Wis. 418, 426, 84 N.W. 855, 85 N.W. 402 (1901).6 Ne-pee-nauk Club v. Wilson, 96 Wis. 290, 71 N.W. 661 (1897).
7Kannenberg, Wisconsin Law of Waters, 1956 Wis. L. REv. 345, 346:
"There is no branch of law in which the rules differ so widely in different
sections of the United States and from state to state as that branch of law
which pertains to Waters."
8 Muench v. Public Service Comm., 261 Wis. 492, 506, 53 N.W. 2d 514, 55 N.W.
2d 40 (1952).
o Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 156 Wis. 261, 145 N.W. 816 (1914).
10 Baker v. Voss, 217 Wis. 415, 259 N.W. 413 (1935).
"N Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Co. v. Railroad Comm., 201 Wis. 40, 47, 228 N.W.
144, 147, 229 N.W. 631 (1930), aff'd 283 U.S. 787 (1930).
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there is language in the decisions indicating that sailing, swim-
ming, skating, and the enjoyment of scenic beauty are all activi-
ties in which the public may indulge in navigable streams. In
fact it seems likely the court will uphold the right of the public
to make any recreational use of a navigable stream that it sees
fit, so long as the recreation involved is otherwise lawful. 12
This language seems to have been made applicable to navigable lakes
by the reasoning contained in a later case. 3
Though the above legal doctrine appears to be well-established, and
though it embraces the interest of the public as paramount, the problem
of access still remains. Assuming the riparian owner controls the land
contiguous to waters, he has a legally recognized right to prevent entry
by the public; the Wisconsin Supreme Court has upheld the riparian
owner's rights in this type of property as against persons who would
stray from or to the lake.' 4
With this background in mind it appears the court reasoned logically
in the face of existing legal doctrine of Wisconsin. In holding that
Section 23.09(14) and the condemnation for which it provides were a
valid means of fulfilling the public rights of use and enjoyment held in
trust, the court stated:
Wisconsin holds the beds underlying navigable lakes in trust for
all its citizens. Hunting is one of the uses of water which are
recognized as public purposes of the trust. . . . Creation of a
public way to the edge of a navigable lake which the public can-
not otherwise conveniently reach simply permits the public to
enjoy the activities for which the state holds the title in trust.1 5
[Emphasis added.]
The phrase containing the words "which the public cannot otherwise
conveniently reach,"' 6 presents an interesting question as to whether
the court, by implication, sought to place a limitation upon the power
granted to the county. Would the county be allowed effective use of
Section 23.09(14) if public access to a lake or stream already existed?
Is it proper to infer that this statute can be used only in the complete
absence of public access, as in Branch v. Oconto County? This remains
an open question, but it appears that a riparian landowner of lake pro-
perty could possibly challenge the right of a county to condemn if there
is an existing public access at some point on the lake.
At the present time it appears that there is a trend favoring more
extensive land development to promote public access to waters. This
intent manifests itself in the enactment of Section 23.09(15) 17 which
12 Waite, Public Rights to Use and Have Access to Navigable Wraters, 1958 Wis.
L. REV. 335, 339.
13 State v. Public Service Comm., 275 Wis. 112, 81 N.W. 2d 71 (1957).
'4 Doemel v. Jantz, 180 Wis. 225, 193 N.W. 393 (1923).
15 Branch v. Oconto County, supra note 1, at 598, 109 N.W. 2d at 107.
16 Ibid.
17 WIS. STAT. §23.09(15) (1959).
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became law subsequent to the commencement of the Branch case. Under
this law the conservation commission is permitted to make certain state
aid available to counties and towns upon their passing a resolution indi-
cating their desire to acquire and improve lands for public access to
navigable lakes or streams in their county or town. The commission
must find that the project will best serve the public interest and the
need of the state as a whole.1 8 There are, however, limitations in that
cities are not eligible for this aid, nor may a county or town receive aid
'to improve existing accesses which they already own.
Through this decision construing Section 23.09(14) and in view of
more recent Section 23.09(15), it appears that Wisconsin has whole-
heartedly adopted a policy of promoting public access to navigable
waters. The condemnation power and the offer of financial assistance
under certain circumstances may instill a desire in county boards to
develop public accesses and recreational facilities in their respective
areas. On the other band the riparian landowner seems to be fighting
a losing battle in view of the manifested state policy. His defenses ap-
pear limited to situations where the taking of land is pursuant to the
arbitrary action of the condemning authority.
Perhaps the most significant point of this decision concerns the
subject of damages. The benefit which the landowner receives in ex-
cluding the public by virtue of his ownership of land surrounding the
lake will not be considered by the court as a property right. Thus, such
personal benefit will not enter into a "before the taking" valuation and
cannot be compensated for as an element of damages.'
JERRY D. GULL
Wills-Liability of Attorney to an Intended Beneficiary for Neg-
ligent Drafting of a Will: Robert Lucas alleged in his complaint
that defendant L. S. Hamm, an attorney at law, had agreed with testator,
Eugene Emmich, to prepare a will and codicils for him by which
plaintiffs were to be beneficiaries of a trust provided for in the will and
to receive 15% of the residue. The instruments provided that the "trust
shall cease and terminate at 12 o'clock on a day five years after the date
upon which the order distributing the trust property to the trustee is
made by the court having jurisdiction over the probation of this will."
The defendant attorney, who was also counsel for the executors, ad-
vised plaintiffs, after the death of testator and admission of the will to
probate, that the trust provision was invalid and advised plaintiffs to
make a settlement with the blood relatives of the testator. Plaintiffs
allege that the attorney's negligent drafting, which violated the statu-
18 49 A.G. 141-142.
19 Branch v. Oconto County, supra note 1, at 602, 109 N.W. 2d at 109.
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